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SHAFFER v. HEITNER: RESHAPING THE CONTOURS
OF STATE COURT JURISDICTION
Due process of law, as applied to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment,1 requires that for a judgment to be binding, a court must first
obtain jurisdiction over the parties to the suit.2 Traditionally, plaintiffs
who were unable to obtain "in personam" jurisdiction over defendants
were not completely without remedy. If a defendant owned property
within the forum state, a plaintiff could attempt to satisfy his claim by
bringing an action directly against that property. 3 Such "in rem" pro-
ceedings were held not to violate due process since, technically, it was
the property, and not its owner, which was the party to the suit.4
In Shaffer v. Heitner,5 the United States Supreme Court repudiated the
traditional distinction between in rem and in personam jurisdiction and
held that an action against property is, in reality, an action against the
interests of the owner of that property. Under this rationale, "in order to
justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis for jurisdiction must
be sufficient to justify exercising jurisdiction over the interest of persons
in a thing.' '6 In other words, if a court's exercise of in personam
jurisdiction over the owner of the property would violate due process
guarantees, his rights may not be circumvented by an in rem proceeding
against his property. Thus, the Court has recognized that there is but one
standard for determining whether a state may exercise jurisdiction consis-
tent with the fourteenth amendment:7 the standard established in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington8 requiring the owner-defendant to have
such minimum contacts with the forum state that "the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.' "9
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
2. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). As a practical matter, a court
need only obtain jurisdiction over the defendant since the plaintiff, by filing the suit, has
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
3. See, e.g., id. at 723-24.
4. Id.
5. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
6. Id. at 2582.
7. Id. at 2584-85.
8.* 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
9. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,463 (1940)). See note 7 supra and
accompanying text.
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The Shaffer opinion is significant in two respects. First, Shaffer
establishes that the mere presence of property within the state will not,
without more, support jurisdiction.10 Second, it is the first Supreme
Court decision in nineteen years to deal directly with the question of
minimum contacts. 1 In addressing these two issues, Shaffer v. Heitner
firmly establishes that principles of fundamental fairness shall govern the
exercise of jurisdiction. In addition, Shaffer provides a new perspective
upon the relationship between state interest and jurisdiction, and raises
interesting questions regarding the degree of forum-related activity
needed to confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.
I. THE OPINION
Shaffer v. Heitner"2 involved a shareholder's derivative suit, filed in
Delaware court, charging various corporate officers of Greyhound Cor-
poration and Greyhound Lines Incorporated with violating their corpo-
rate responsibilities. The complaint alleged that the corporate officer
defendants had violated their duties to the corporations by engaging in
acts in Oregon which subjected the corporations to substantial antitrust
liability. 13
At the time of the suit, Greyhound was incorporated under the laws of
Delaware, while Greyhound Lines, its wholly-owned subsidiary, was a
California corporation. Both corporations had their principal place of
business in Arizona. 14 The individual corporate defendants, none of
whom were residents or domiciliaries of Delaware, were not alleged to
have had any connection with that state other than their status as officers
of a Delaware corporation and their ownership of stock in that corpora-
tion.
Simultaneously with filing the complaint, the plaintiff filed a motion
under Delaware's sequestration statute15 requesting an order sequestering
10. 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83.
11. The last major Supreme Court decision interpreting the requirements of minimum
contacts was Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
12. 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
13. Id. at 2572-73.
14. Id. at 2572.
15. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974) provides in part:
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the defendant or
any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court may make
an order directing such nonresident defendant or defendants to appear by a day
certain to be designated. Such order shall be served on such nonresident defendant or
defendants by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published in such manner
as the Court directs, not less than once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The Court
may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his
property, which property may be sold under the order of the Court to pay the demand
of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise defaults.
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property located in Delaware belonging to the corporate officer defend-
ants. Pursuant to the issuance of the order, intangible property, consist-
ing primarily of common stock in Greyhound, was seized and brought
within the jurisdiction of the court. 16 This property was deemed to be
located in Delaware under a statute which establishes that state as the
"situs" of all stock in Delaware corporations regardless of where the
actual certificates may be located. 7
The individual defendants were notified by publication and by certified
mail and those whose property had been seized responded by entering a
special appearance. 11 The defendants contended that Delaware's ex parte
sequestration procedure did not accord them due process of law, that the
property seized was not capable of attachment, and that they did not have
sufficient contacts with the State of Delaware to satisfy the standard of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.'9 Delaware's lower court reject-
ed these arguments,2" and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, 2'
quickly dismissing the defendants' contention that International Shoe's
standard of minimum contacts governed in rem proceedings.22
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2573-74. Also sequestered were stock unit credits, options, warrants
and contractual rights belonging to the individual defendants. Id. at 2574 n.8. The value of
the sequestered stock alone was approximately $1,200,000. Id. at n.7.
17. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts
held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the
capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State, whether
organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2574. While under Delaware law, a defendant can appear solely for the
purpose of attacking compliance with the sequestration statute, see note 15 supra, a
defendant who wishes to defend on the merits must enter a general appearance. In so
doing, he subjects himself to the full in personam jurisdiction of the court. Greyhound
Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 233 & n.8, 235-36 (Del. 1976).
19. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2574. For a discussion of the requirements of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), see notes 41-46 infra and
accompanying text.
20. Delaware's lower court, the Court of Chancery, stated that the avowed purpose of
the Delaware sequestration law is not to secure possession of property, but rather, to
compel the personal appearance of nonresident defendants. Delaware Court of Chancery
letter opinion, cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2574. See also Sands v. Lefcourt
Realty Corp., 117 A.2d 365 (Del. 1955). The Delaware court further found that Delaware's
sequestration procedures were consistent with the due process requirements established
in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and its progeny, see notes 80-82
infra and accompanying text; that Delaware's situs of stock rule was constitutionally
permissible, see note 17 supra; and that the stock's statutory situs in Delaware was
sufficient for the exercise of in rem jurisdiction. Delaware Court of Chancery letter
opinion, cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2574-75.
21. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976). The court's opinion was
centered largely upon a rejection of the argument that Delaware's sequestration procedure
was violative of due process of law under the Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp. line of cases.
See notes 80-82 infra and accompanying text.
22. 361 A.2d at 229.
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The United States Supreme Court, after reviewing the historical devel-
opment of modern theories of jurisdiction,2 3 devoted the remainder of its
opinion to the question of whether in rem proceedings are governed by
the minimum contacts rationale of International Shoe *24
The case for applying to jurisdiction in rem the same test of "fair
play and substantial justice" as governs assertions of jurisdiction in
personam is simple and straightforward. It is premised on recogni-
tion that "[t]he phrase, 'judicial jurisdiction over a thing,' is a
customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the inter-
ests of persons in a thing." This recognition leads to the conclusion
that in order to justify an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the basis
for jurisdiction must be sufficient to justify exercising "jurisdiction
over the interests of persons in a thing." The standard for determin-
ing whether an exercise of jurisdiction over the interests of persons
is consistent with the Due Process Clause is the minimum contacts
standard elucidated in International Shoe.
25
Applying the International Shoe test to the facts in Shaffer, the Court
found that the cause of action was not related to the sequestered property
and that the property itself did not, therefore, provide sufficient contacts
with Delaware to warrant assertion of jurisdiction. 26 The Court also
found that other possible "contacts" with Delaware did not justify
jurisdiction since, under the standard of Hanson v. Denckla,27 the de-
fendants had not "purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state." 2 The fact that the defend-
23. 97 S. Ct. at 2576-81.
24. Id. at 2572. The Court expressly excluded any consideration of whether the
Delaware sequestration procedure was ,violative of due process notice requirements, id.,
such as those established in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See notes
80-82 infra and accompanying text.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
56, Introductory Note (1971)).
26. Id. at 2585-87. While not directly addressed by the Court in the Shaffer opinion, the
constitutionality of Delaware's situs of stock rule has been openly questioned. See, e.g.,
United States Indus. Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 143, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 2972 (1977).
27. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
28. 97 S. Ct. at 2586 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)).
Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion indicated his desire to retain a presumption that
the presence of property "indisputably and permanently located within a state" would,
without more, provide the contacts necessary for an exercise of jurisdiction. Id. at 2587.
Since the majority addressed the question of property permanently located in the state and
stated that its presence would normally indicate the existence of sufficient minimum
contacts, Mr. Justice Powell's concern regarding jurisdiction over such property seems
unfounded.
Mr. Justice Stevens expressed his opinion that a state law which forces a defendant who
appears on the merits to be subjected to full in personam jurisdiction is unconstitutional.
Id. at 2588.
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ants were officers of a Delaware corporation was not enough, in and of
itself, to constitute minimum contacts and, absent a state statute constru-
ing acceptance of a corporate directorship as tantamount to consent to
suit, the state's interest in the litigation was not sufficient to justify in
personam jurisdiction.2 9 Further, the Delaware statute establishing that
state as the situs of the stock was neither a sufficient indication of contact
with the state, nor a reasonable indication of consent to suit, to confer
jurisdiction.
30
I. HARBINGERS OF SHAFFER V. HEITNER
In holding that jurisdiction in in rem proceedings requires that the
property's owner have minimum contacts with the state, the Court in
Shaffer v. Heitner overruled one hundred year old precedents. The seeds
of Shaffer, however, can be detected in the very cases it overturns, as
well as in the cases it follows. From the beginning, the Court'has been
concerned with the protection of the due process rights of the individu-
al. 31 Yet the Court for many years resisted the recognition that juris-
diction over property is, in reality, jurisdiction over.persons. 32 The result
was an illogically bifurcated system of jurisdiction 33 which emphasized
due process for some and ignored due process for others. Shaffer has
consolidated the systems of in rem and in personam jurisdiction into a
single theory designed to provide due process for all. To fully understand
the significance of the Shaffer opinion, it is essential to understand the
cases from which it evolved.
The evolution of modem theories of state court jurisdiction can be
traced to a dispute between an attorney and his client. The case of
Pennoyer v. Neff 3 began when Mitchell, an attorney, sought a judgment
in an Oregon court against his client, Neff. Neff, although a nonresident
of the State of Oregon, owned land within that state. Oregon law permit-
ted service-of process on nonresident property owners to be effected by
publication. Neff was so served and, upon his default, Mitchell obtained
29. Id. at 2586.
30. Id. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732-33 (1877) (explaining that judgments
which presume to determine the personal rights of defendants over whom personal
jurisdiction has not been obtained violate due process of law).
32. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (implicitly
limiting its new minimum contacts rule to in personam jurisdiction, seemingly without
regard for the due process needs of the owners of property attached in in rem proceed-
ings).
33. See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT.
REv. 241, 244 [hereinafter cited as Hazard].
34. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
1977]
92 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
a judgment against him. Neff's land was then sold to Pennoyer in
satisfaction of the judgment. Following the sale, Neff brought an action
of ejectment against Pennoyer.
35
On a writ of error, the Supreme Court held that judgments which
determine the personal rights of parties are invalid in the absence of
personal jurisdiction over those parties. 36 Each state, according to the
Court, was said to have exclusive jurisdiction over all persons and
property within its boundaries. 37 Thus, one state's process could not
extend into the territory of another. 38 Since Neff had been outside the
state at the time of the purported service, the Oregon court did not obtain
personal jurisdiction over him. Furthermore, although the court could
have obtained jurisdiction over the local property, it failed to attach the
property prior to judgment, thereby failing to invoke jurisdiction.
Pennoyer's territorial concept of jurisdiction was based upon the
notion that the state's physical power extended only to persons and
property within its boundaries. 39 The Pennoyer Court did not differ-
entiate between power over land and power over persons. Yet, as society
became more mobile, a need developed for a means to reach persons
outside of the state's physical boundaries.' In International Shoe Co. v.
Washington,4 the Court acted unequivocally to fulfill this need. Interna-
tional Shoe involved a suit brought in the State of Washington against a
Delaware corporation for the recovery of unpaid contributions to Wash-
ington's unemployment compensation fund. The corporation had no
offices in Washington and made no contracts there; it did, however,
solicit sales within the state. Although these solicitations were the only
contact between the defendant and the state, the Court held that the
solicitations provided sufficient grounds for Washington to exercise
jurisdiction over the corporation. In so holding, the Court could have
relied upon previously developed fictions of presence 42 or consent to
suit,43 but instead it rejected both the territorial concept of Pennoyer and
35. Id. at 715-18.
36. Id. at 732-33.
37. Id. at 722.
38. Id.
39. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2578 (1977).
40. Id. at 2579 (ascribing the need largely to the advent of the automobile).
41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. See, e.g., International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914) (holding that a
corporation's purely interstate business, conducted within the state, established its pres-
ence within that state and justified service of process upon the corporation).
43. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding a Massachusetts statute
providing that a nonresident motorist's use of Massachusetts highways constituted ap-




[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of
the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice." 44
International Shoe, however, referred specifically to in personam
jurisdiction over parties not present in the state. It was not applied to in
rem jurisdiction or to persons present within the state. Thus, the exercise
of in rem jurisdiction was effectively exempted from the due process
requirements of "fair play and substantial justice." '45 As a result, the
rules of in personam and in rem jurisdiction developed separately. 46
As the rules of in personam jurisdiction evolved, the Court indicated a
readiness to permit exercises of jurisdiction based upon increasingly
minimal contacts, provided that the exercise of such jurisdiction was
consistent with "fair play and substantial justice." In McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co. ,47 a Texas insurer, who did no business in
California and had no other contacts with the state, took over the policies
of another insurance company. The new insurer solicited a reinsurance
agreement with a California resident who had been insured with the
previous company. When a claim arose, the insurer refused payment.
Based upon a California statute subjecting foreign insurance companies
to suit in California in causes of action arising from policies held by
California residents,48 the California courts exercised jurisdiction over
the company. The case reached the United States Supreme Court after a
Texas court refused full faith and credit to the California judgment. The
Texas court found the California judgment to be invalid since California
had not obtained personal jurisdiction over the insurance company. The
Supreme Court reversed, finding minimum contacts between California
and the defendant insurer. The Court noted, in particular, that the
insurance company had substantial connection with California as a result
of the transaction, that the state of California had a legitimate interest in
44. 326 U.S. at 316 (citation omitted).
45. Id.
46. See generally Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1132-33 (3d Cir. 1976)
(Gibbons, J., concurring) (observing that the rule of International Shoe did not unequivoc-
ally mandate its limitation to cases of in personam jurisdiction, and that it would not have
been inconsistent for courts to read International Shoe as applicable to in rem juris-
diction).
47. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
48. CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-1620 (West 1972).
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regulating insurers who solicited business in the state, and that it was not
a violation of due process to exercise personal jurisdiction in this case.
49
In 1958, less than one year after McGee, the Supreme Court decided
Hanson v. Denckla.s° In Hanson, a settlor had established a trust in
Delaware before becoming a Florida resident. Once in Florida, however,
she continued to exercise control over the trust by sending specific
instructions to the trustee. Upon the settlor's death, her estate was
probated in Florida.5" Florida attempted to obtain jurisdiction over all
indispensable parties including the Delaware trustee. The question before
the Supreme Court was whether Florida, consistent with the requirements
of due process, could exercise jurisdiction over the trustee. Other than
the trustee's correspondence with the settlor in Florida, there were no
alleged contacts between the trustee and the state. For the first time, the
Court emphasized the limitations of state court jurisdiction. It held that to
fulfill the minimum contacts test prescribed in International Shoe, "it is
essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its
laws." 52
While in personam jurisdiction was developing under the test of
International Shoe, in rem jurisdiction53 was evolving along completely
49. 355 U.S. at 223.
50. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
51. Hanson involved a heated family dispute over the proceeds of the settlor's estate.
The settlor, while a resident of Pennsylvania, purported to create a trust in favor of some
of her grandchildren. She named a Delaware corporation as trustee and then moved to
Florida where she made certain adjustments in the trust. While in Florida, she made a will
by which she bequeathed all assets not then properly distributed to two of her three
daughters. After her death, the two daughters claimed that the trust she had established in
Delaware was invalid, and that consequently, the trust assets should pass under her will to
them. The daughters brought suit in Florida and the trust beneficiaries moved to dismiss
on the ground that the Delaware trustee was an indispensable party under Florida law who
could not be joined for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Florida Supreme Court held that
the Delaware trustee was subject to the Florida court's jurisdiction and that the trust
assets should pass to the heirs under the will. In the meantime, however, the trust
beneficiaries had filed suit in Delaware. The suit reached the Delaware Supreme Court
whose ruling directly contradicted that of Florida. The actions were consolidated by the
United States Supreme Court, which held, inter alia, that the Delaware trustee had not
been properly subjected to the jurisdiction of the Florida court. In order to establish the
presence of adequate minimum contacts, the Court held that the "unilateral activity of
those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the
requirement of contact with the forum state." 357 U.S. at 253.
52. Id.
53. For convenience, the term "in rem" will be used to refer to the general category of
jurisdiction encompassing true in rem, quasi in rem type I and quasi in rem type II. See
notes 58-64 infra and accompanying text for explanation of the individual terms.
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independent lines. In Pennoyer v. Neff, Mr. Justice Field observed that a
court could not directly affect the personal interests of the defendant
without jurisdiction over him.5 4 However., proceedings against property
were viewed as not directly affecting the personal interests of the own-
er.55 The court's jurisdiction in these cases was deemed to be over the
property rather than the person.56 Consequently, the judgment in an in
rem proceeding was to be limited to the value of the property over which
the court had obtained jurisdiction.57
As the Court observed in Hanson v. Denckla58 and again in Shaffer,59
in rem jurisdiction developed into three separate categories. These
categories are generally known as "true in rem," "quasi in rem type I"
and "quasi in rem type II. '"60 True in rem jurisdiction purports 'to
adjudicate the rights of "all the world" in a designated property. All the
claims that any person may have to that specific piece of property are
decided in a single true in rem proceeding.
61
Quasi in rem I also deals with direct claims to specific property. But
unlike a true in rem proceeding, a quasi in rem I proceeding does not
purport to decide the claims of all the world in the subject property. It
decides only the claims of the specific parties.62
Quasi in rem II is similar to quasi in rem I in that it only decides the
rights of specific parties. But unlike quasi in rem I cases, quasi in rem II
cases involve claims to the property which are derivative, rather than
direct.63 The claimant seeks to obtain a judgment against the property in
order to satisfy a different claim against the property's owner. The
original claim out of which the suit arises ordinarily has nothing at all to
do with the property which is attached. 64
54. 95 U.S. at 723.
55. The Court held that the permissible exercise of the state's power over property
within its borders would often have some effect upon persons outside the territory, but
that such effect was not tantamount to the "direct" effect which the decision rejected as
an unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 725.
58. 357 U.S. at 246 n.12.
59. 97 S. Ct. at 2577-78 n.17.
60. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 909, 948-66 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Developments] (extensively discussing the
categories of in rem jurisdiction).
61. 97 S. Ct. at 2577-78 n.17.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 2582. See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
1977]
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The most famous of the quasi in rem II cases is the case of Harris v.
Balk 5 which was overruled by Shaffer v. Heitner.6 6 Harris and Balk
were North Carolina residents. Harris owed Balk $180. When Harris
visited Maryland, a creditor of Balk's served Harris with a writ of
attachment, garnishing his debt to Balk. The creditor obtained a default
judgment against Balk and the $180 was paid to the creditor by Harris.
Later, Balk sued Harris to collect the debt. Harris pleaded the prior
Maryland judgment. Although the North Carolina court held the attach-
ment invalid, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the debt had
traveled with Harris to Maryland where it had been properly attached.
Harris thus established that even intangible "property" present within a
state through no act of the property's owner could be attached in satisfac-
tion of an unrelated claim against the owner. Without significant change,
Harris remained an essentially accurate reflection of the scope of in rem
jurisdiction until Shaffer v. Heitner.
67
The end result of the independent evolutions of in rem and in personam
jurisdictions was an illogically bifurcated system of state jurisdictional
power. 68 As the two systems developed, the inherent unfairness of
proceedings typified by Harris v. Balk became increasingly difficult to
reconcile with the Court's growing emphasis upon "fair play and sub-
stantial justice"6 9 in the area of in personam jurisdiction. As the Court
observed in Shaffer, the vast majority of commentators had long urged
abandonment of the traditional in rem rules and suggested the adoption of
a universal standard of "fair play and substantial justice" to determine
all types of jurisdiction.70
65. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
66. 97 S. Ct. at 2585 n.39.
67. Id. Although Harris dates from 1905, its vitality was recognized in New York in
1966 when that state's courts decided Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312,269
N.Y.S. 2d 99 (1966). In Seider, an insured's right to be indemnified and defended under an
automobile insurance policy issued by an insurer doing business in New York was deemed
to be a "debt" within the state. A tort plaintiff was permitted to attach this "debt" in a
quasi in rem II proceeding arising out of an automobile accident which occurred outside of
the state. Since Seider was decided without reference to any contacts between the forum
state and the defendant. Seider appears to be implicitly overruled in Shaffer. See 97 S. Ct.
at 2585 n.39. However, if Seider is viewed not as a quasi in rem action against the insured,
but instead as a form of direct action against the insurer, Seider may remain valid. See
generally Note, Minichiello v. Rosenberg: Garnishment of Intangibles-In Search of a
Rationale, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 407 (1969). But see Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d
629, 552 P.2d 728, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768 (1976) (the California Supreme Court holding that an
insurer's contingent liabilities to defend and indemnify the insured were not attachable as
"property" within the state under California's attachment statute).
68. See Hazard, supra note 33, at 244.
69. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
70. 97 S. Ct. at 2581. See generally Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
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The very basis of the Pennoyer Court's reasoning that mere presence
of property within a state confers jurisdiction over that property had been
seriously questioned, 71 and the two separate systems of in rem and in
personam jurisdiction had been characterized as being so inconsistent as
to defy the logical application of either.72 Of all of the forms of in. rem
jurisdiction, quasi in rem H had been the subject of the greatest critical
outrage.73
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289 (1956);
Hazard, supra note 33; Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEX. L. REV. 657
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Traynor]; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966) [hereinafter cited as von Mehren];
Developments, supra note 60. But see Smit, The Enduring Utility of In Rem Rules: A
Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Smit].
71. See Hazard, supra note 33; Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Outmoded and
Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 668 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Zammit].
72. See Hazard, supra note 33, at 244, 278. Commentators have also been quick to
observe that the elements of Pennoyer have suffered steady erosion throughout the
twentieth century. See, e.g., id. at 272-81.
73. See Hazard, supra note 33; von Mehren, supra note 70; Zammit, supra note 71.
Even commentators who endorse the continuing utility of the in rem rules reject the
concept of quasi in rem II jurisdiction. See, e.g., Smit, supra note 70, at 620-22.
The critical disapproval of quasi in rem II has been mirrored in the courts as well. See,
e.g., United States Indus. Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142, 154 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 2972 (1977) (holding that the traditional "labels" of in rem, quasi in rem, and in
personam should not be determinative of constitutional rights, and that the standard of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), should be applied to all
exercises of state court jurisdiction); Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1137 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (suggesting that the same standards of fundamental
fairness as have been established for in personam jurisdiction should also be applied to
cases of in rem jurisdiction); Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 345, 316 P.2d
960, 965 (1955), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 357 U.S. 569 (1958) (holding that "the
emphasis is no longer placed on actual physical presence [of property within the state] but
on the bearing that local contacts have to the question of over-all fair play and substantial
justice").
Despite the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court prior to Shaffer, state courts had
increasingly utilized a minimum contacts analysis in determining the propriety of the
exercise of quasi in rem II jurisdiction. See Camire v. Scieszka, 116 N.H. 302, 358 A.2d
397 (1976). Cf. Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 288, 401 P.2d 743 (1965) (finding establish-
ment of jurisdiction through utilization of in rem, quasi in rem, and minimum contacts
theories).
Other courts read portions of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306 (1950), and Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), together as indicating that the
Supreme Court would require minimum contacts in in rem actions. See United States
Indus. Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 154 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2972 (1977);
Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1137 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concur-
ring) (also observing that all Supreme Court endorsements of quasi in rem II jurisdiction
preceded the establishment of the minimum contacts rule of International Shoe). Cf.
Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 115 (1963) (rejecting the argument that cases involving real
property should be treated differently from cases involving adjudications of personal
rights for res judicata purposes).
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The criticisms of in rem jurisdiction take on added significance when
coupled with the fact that in rem proceedings are no longer utilized as a
means of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent
they were in the years immediately following Pennoyer. One of the
primary factors leading to the erosion of the utility of in rem proceedings
as a means of acquiring jurisdiction has been the development of state
"long arm" statutes. Pennoyer v. Neff had held that a state could not
"extend its process beyond that [state's] territory so as to subject either
persons or property to its decisions. "74 In the years immediately follow-
ing, plaintiffs could not directly reach persons or property located outside
the forum state. In this context, the exercise of in rem forms of juris-
diction was the only means by which a resident of a state could obtain a
local judgment in satisfaction of his claim against an out-of-state defend-
ant.
By the time that the Supreme Court decided McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co. 75 the concept of long arm jurisdiction had become so
thoroughly accepted that the Court was able to condone its further
expansion to meet the needs of modern multi-state commerce. Since
McGee, state long arm statutes have continued to grow, and an increas-
ing number of states now permit an exercise of jurisdiction over non-
residents circumscribed only by the outer limits of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 76 Therefore, while in rem proceedings may
have been useful as a jurisdictional device in the days of Pennoyer v.
Neff, many commentators feel that with the advent of extra-territorial
service of process, as typified by the long arm statutes, this aspect of in
rem proceedings has outlived its usefulness.
77
Traditionally, courts had favored the defendant in determining the
state in which personal jurisdiction over him would be proper, "on the
theory, . . . that since the plaintiff controls the institution of suit he
might behave oppressively toward the defendant unless restricted." 78 In
recent years, however, the same factors of increased multi-state activity
that created the need for state long arm statutes have, in many circum-
stances, removed or reduced the defendant's need for special juris-
dictional protection. With individuals and corporations now taking ad-
vantage of modem interstate mobility, the traditional notion of fairness to
74. 95 U.S. at 722.
75. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
76. E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1970).
77. See von Mehren, supra note 70, at 1178-79.
78. Sunderland, The Provisions Relating to Trial Practice in the New Illinois Civil
Practice Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 188, 192 (1933).
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the defendant has been largely counterbalanced by notions of fairness to
local plaintiffs injured by interstate activities. It seems no longer possible
to say that fairness requires preference for one party over the other, but
rather, what seems required is an examination of the facts of the individu-
al case.7 9
Finally, the Supreme Court's decisions involving notice and hearing
requirements in attachment proceedings have reduced the advantages of
in rem proceedings. Beginning with Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. ,80 the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, redefined the notice
requirements of fourteenth amendment due process as they relate to local
attachment actions. State attachment procedures, which for years had
gone unquestioned, were found to deny the defendant the notice and
opportunity to be heard required by due process of law.8" The Court's
position indicates an ever-increasing emphasis upon expansive notions of
due process, based to a large extent upon concepts of fairness "derived
not alone . . . from the specifics of the Constitution, but also. . .from
concepts which are part of the Anglo-American legal heritage .... 82
It is also these cases, perhaps more than any factor, which signaled the
eventual demise of in rem jurisdiction. By emphasizing that an attach-
ment of property affected the rights of its owner, 83 the Court set the stage
for the decision that in rem proceedings were, in reality, personal actions
against the owner.
79. See generally von Mehren, supra note 70, at 1166-67.
80. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (holding that a pre-judgment garnishment procedure which
permitted one half of the debtor's wages to be frozen in the interim between the garnish-
ment and the main suit, without providing the defendant with notice and opportunity to be
heard, deprived the defendant of due process of law).
81. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (holding that a
state statute which permitted garnishment of a corporation's bank account based upon
mere conclusory allegations by plaintiff, without the participation of a judge or prior
notice and opportunity to be heard, violated due process of law); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972) (holding that state provisions for the replevin of chattels which did not
provide the possessor with prior notice and opportunity to be heard and which did not
afford judicial supervision violated due process of law, regardless of the availability of
procedures for post-seizure hearings and regardless of the fact that the chattels were not
"necessities of life"). But see Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (holding
that a state's sequestration procedure did not violate due process of law when it sufficient-
ly protected the interests of the possessor of chattels, although the procedure did not
provide for notice or opportunity to be heard prior to the property's sequestration).
82. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. at 342-43 (Harland, J., concurring). Com-
pare id. at 344-51 (Black, J., dissenting).
83. See generally authorities cited notes 80-81 supra.
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III. PRACTICAL EFFECTS UPON AREAS OF ADJUDICATION TRADITION-
ALLY SUBJECT TO IN REM JURISDICTION
In holding that actions against property84 require a showing of the
owner's minimum contacts with the state, Shaffer v. Heitner discards the
concept advanced in Pennoyer v. Neff that a state's power over property
confers jurisdiction over causes of action concerning that property. As a
practical matter, the pertinent inquiry now concerns Shaffer's effect
upon the ability of states to adjudicate causes of action which had
traditionally been brought as true in rem, quasi in rem I or quasi in rem II
proceedings. An analysis of these proceedings reveals that, while the
basis of jurisdiction has been changed, the states' power to adjudicate
these matters, with one exception, has not been significantly curtailed.
A. True In Rem and Quasi In Rem I Actions
While for most purposes Shaffer's effect on true in rem and quasi in
rem I will be negligible, it is in the area of true in rem proceedings that
the Shaffer opinion creates the most conceptual difficulties. In true in
rem proceedings, the power to adjudicate has been based upon bringing
the property within the jurisdiction of the court. Since such proceedings
have been traditionally utilized to determine all possible claims to the
subject property,85 any parallel to a true in rem action will, by necessity,
involve the possible existence of unknown claimants whose rights to the
property will be determined in the litigation. Now that jurisdiction can no
longer be based upon the presence of property alone, but must instead be
based upon minimum contacts on the part of the individuals whose rights
are to be adjudicated, the possibility of unknown claimants presents
several problems. How is a court to establish that an unknown claimant
has minimum contacts with the state? The Shaffer Court provided the
answer:
[T]he presence of property in a State may bear on the existence of
jurisdiction, by providing contacts among the forum State, the de-
fendant and the litigation. For example, when claims to the property
itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the
84. While in rem jurisdiction has been utilized most extensively in the adjudication of
rights to real or personal property it is also used in the so called "status" cases. Adjudica-
tions of status include divorce, separation, actions to nullify a marriage, adoption, cus-
tody, and guardianship. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND)-OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§
69-79 (1971). Like the Court in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734 (1877), the Court in
Shaffer expressly excluded "adjudications of status" from its holding. 97 S. Ct. at 2582
n.30. Since these cases are excluded from the Shaffer ruling, Shaffer will not interfere
with precedent in this area.
85. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2577-78 n.17.
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plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where
the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the
defendant's claim to property located in the State would normally
indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of his
interest. The State's strong interests in assuring the marketability of
property within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful
resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would
also support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important
records and witnesses will be found in the State.
86
Despite the fact that the identity of the claimant is unknown, he can be
said to have minimum contacts with the state as a result of the very fact
that he has a claim to property in the state and expects "to benefit from
the State's protection of his interest." ' 87 Although this reasoning is not
completely satisfactory, it seems no more attenuated than the reasoning
in traditional true in rem cases which based jurisdiction to adjudicate the
rights of all parties upon the state's power over the property.8" In fact, the
new form of reasoning advocated in Shaffer is very similar to the older
form. In the past, true in rem jurisdiction was based upon the state's
territorial power; now it is based in large part upon the state's interest in
property within its boundaries.
8 9
86. Id. at 2582 (footnotes omitted). As expressly stated by the Court, this discussion is
as applicable to quasi in rem proceedings as to true in rem proceedings. Id. at 2582 n.24.
The Court indirectly recognized that when the property which is the source of controversy
is brought into the state without the knowledge or consent of the owner, the presence of
the property will not support an inference of minimum contacts.
The Court stated that "[i]n some circumstances the presence of property in the forum
State will not support the inference [of minimum contacts]." Id. at 2582 n.24. The Court
then cited to a particular portion of an article by then California Supreme Court Justice
Roger B. Traynor in which he discussed the case of People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48
Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957). That case involved an automobile which was seized in
accordance with a California statute providing for the seizure and forfeiture of auto-
mobiles used to transport narcotics. The automobile had come to California from Texas in
contravention of a sales agreement between the transporting party, one Willie Smith, and
the party who sold him the car and who had retained a chattel mortgage to secure Willie's
debt. While under California law the mortgagee would have lost his security, the court
found that he was entitled to the return of the automobile. See Traynor, supra note 70, at
672-73. The inference of the Supreme Court's citation to this factual situation is that such
circumstances would not provide minimum contacts. Compare the concept of chattels
improperly or illegally brought into the state with the circumstances of Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905), where the "debt" was brought into Maryland without Balk's knowledge
or consent.
87. 97 S. Ct. at 2852.
88. Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Shaffer may reflect his discomfort with
the attenuated analysis required to achieve this result. See note 28 supra.
89. State interest and the problems associated with it are discussed at notes 160-82 infra
and accompanying text.
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Once the obstacle of the claimant's minimum contacts with the forum
state has been surmounted, it becomes relatively simple to satisfy the
unknown claimant's due process rights to notice and opportunity to be
heard. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank,' the Court held that the
due process rights of unknown potential claimants to a trust would be
satisfied by "notice reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to
apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action .... "91 But the
Court did approve of notice by publication in cases where other forms of
notice were not possible or practical. 92 Thus, while Shaffer provides a
formula for finding minimum contacts between the unknown claimant
and forum state, Mullane provides an acceptable means of fulfilling the
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard. The end result is that
under Shaffer v. Heitner the old form of true in rem adjudication has
been replaced by a substitute which, although based upon jurisdiction
over the person rather than the property, will yield almost identical
results .9
This new analysis is equally applicable to the old quasi in rem I
actions94 with the added simplification that there will be fewer problems
with unidentified claimants.
95
B. Quasi In Rem II
The practical impact of Shaffer will be felt most in the area of quasi in
rem II jurisdiction. 96 International Shoe requires that when the contacts
between the defendant and the forum are minimal, the cause of action
must arise from or relate to those contacts. 97 Since by their very defini-
90. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
91. Id. at 314.
92. Id. at 317.
93. One commentator has observed that it is much more reasonable to subject an owner
to the decisions of a court in in rem actions when the property is permanently located
within the state. Smit, supra note 70, at 617-23. This analysis seems consistent with the
examination of minimum contacts prescribed in Shaffer. The same commentator has also
suggested that the fact property is tangible rather than intangible will also have an impact
upon the analysis. Id. at 622-23. Although the Shaffer opinion does not clearly suggest
whether or not this would be a factor, its emphasis upon the fictional nature of Delaware's
situs of stock rule may imply that the tangibility of the property would also provide some
guidelines when fictional situs rules create unfair or arbitrary situations.
94. The Shaffer Court applied the same basic analysis to true in rem and quasi in rem I
cases. See 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.24.
95. By definition, quasi in rem I includes only specific claimants to property. See notes
58-62 supra and accompanying text.
96. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
97. [T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations
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tions98 true in rem and quasi in rem I actions arise from or relate to the
property claimed by the parties, the test will be satisfied in most cases.
99
However, in quasi in rem II actions, typified by Harris v. Balk,"° the
cause of action rarely arises from or relates to the property which is the
subject matter of the suit:'' the plaintiff's claim to the subject property is
almost always asserted to satisfy a different claim against the property's
owner. 102
In Shaffer the Court noted that the presence of property within the
state might support jurisdiction in quasi in rem II actions where the cause
of action was in some way related to the property. 03 However, the Court
distinguished cases such as Harris and Shaffer as cases in which the
cause of action was "completely unrelated" to the property. 104 In such
causes of action, it held that the presence of the property alone would not
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (emphasis added) (cita-
tions omitted).
98. See notes 58-62 supra and accompanying text.
99. A probable exception to this rule would be property brought into the state without
the consent of its owner and claimed by another party. See note 86 supra.
100. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
101. See Shaffer's discussion of causes of action typified by Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S.
215 (1905) and the principal case, where the basis for state court jurisdiction was "com-
pletely unrelated" to the plaintiff's cause of action. 97 S. Ct. at 2582-83. See also Steele v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 483 F.2d 339, 348 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974),
where the ca'use of action did not arise from the attached property, and where the court
recognized that minimum contacts might be significant in in rem jurisdiction, but then
found that the mere presence of creditors within the state represented "a crucial point of
contact" which "goes far toward providing the essential 'minimum' necessary" for
jurisdiction.
102. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text.
103. While a quasi in rem II proceeding could involve a cause of action related to the
attached property, see, e.g., Shaffer, 97 S. Ct. at 2582 n.29, as a practical matter it would
be rare under modern long arm statutes to have such a cause of action litigated as a quasi
in rem II proceeding. It is not unusual for state long arm statutes to provide for an exercise
of full in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defendants when the defendants own
property within the state and the cause of action arises from or relates to that property.
See CAL. Civ. P ROC. CODE § 410.10, Approved Judicial Council Comment 459, 474 (West
1973).
Note also that the Court did not cite a single case of quasi in rem II jurisdiction where
the cause of action arose from or related to the subject property, but rather proposed a
hypothetical. 97 S. Ct. at 2582. The Court's failure to cite an actual example of such a case
may well indicate the rarity of quasi in rem II actions where the cause of action relates to
the subject property. Thus, the kind of quasi in rem II action that does not relate to the
subject property is disallowed in Shaffer, and the kind of quasi in rem II situation which
does relate to the subject property, while it may be a permissible exercise of jurisdiction,
will rarely occur.
104. 97 S. Ct. at 2582 (emphasis added).
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be sufficient to provide the requisite minimum contacts for an exercise of
personal jurisdiction. 105
The Court's objection to in rem jurisdiction is clearly focused upon the
narrow area of quasi in rem II cases in which the cause of action is
completely unrelated'016 to the defendant's contacts with the state. °7 In
cases formerly adjudicated as true in rem and quasi in rem I actions, the
courts will experience little or no difficulty in finding that the required
minimum contacts exist. In these types of proceedings the change has
been one more of form than of substance. 0 8 It is only in cases like Harris
v. Balk, where the cause of action is unrelated to contacts with the state,
that jurisdiction will be denied. 109 Shaffer v. Heitner is not the death
knell for in rem jurisdiction. The bell tolls only for quasi in rem II.
C. Questions Left Unanswered
What is clear from Shaffer v. Heitner is that the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment requires that, in order to adjudicate a person's
interests in property, it must first be shown that that person had minimum
105. Id. at 2582-83.
106. Id. at 2582.
107. The Court noted that in cases where the cause of action is related to the defend-
ant's property within the state, "jurisdiction over many types of actions which now are or
might be brought in rem would not be affected. . . ." Id.
108. Although judgments in in rem proceedings were limited to the value of the
property attached, see notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text, this had little or no
effect in true in rem and quasi in rem I actions. The claim was to the property itself, and
therefore the value of the claim did not exceed the value of the property that could be
attached in satisfaction of the judgment.
109. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). In Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26,
1977), summarized in 46 U.S.L.W. 2195 (Oct. 18, 1977), the Northern District of Califor-
nia recognized an exception to this general rule. In that case, the ex parte attachment of a
debt owed by a California corporation to a French corporation was permitted despite the
fact that the French corporation did not have sufficient minimum contracts to justify an
exercise of personal jurisdiction. The action was brought by a North Carolina plaintiff
who sought the attachment solely as a means of protecting an award that the plaintiff
could receive as a result of a New York action it was pursuing against the defendant
French corporation. While the California property was not related to the plaintiff's New
York action, the court noted that it was apparently the defendant's only asset in the
United States and, but for the attachment, would be removed from the country.
In permitting the attachment, the court relied on the following language from Shaffer:
"[A] State in which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by
use of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the
litigation can be maintained consistently with Interational Shoe." 97 S. Ct. at 2583. It
would therefore appear that a court may attach the property of a nonresident over whom
it may not exercise personal jurisdiction if that nonresident is properly within the
personal jurisdiction of another state. Such attachment would not be permissible in all
circumstances and would not confer upon the court the jurisdiction to adjudicate the
merits of the plaintiff's claim. 46 U.S.L.W. at 2196.
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contacts with the forum state. What is unclear from Shaffer is whether a
state must actually acquire personal jurisdiction over that party before
adjudicating those rights. The Court's ultimate conclusion in this area
will have significant impact upon present state jurisdictional statutes.
While Shaffer determines the permissible bases for jurisdiction under
the Constitution, it is the states which confer jurisdiction upon their
courts. Although state legislatures have the option of delegating power to
their courts up to the outer limits of due process, many state legislatures
have declined to' delegate all of the power they possess. 10 It is not
uncommon for state long arm statutes to explicitly'or implicitly prohibit
jurisdiction in areas in which an exercise of jurisdiction would be con-
stitutionally permissible.111 In such states, in rem statutes were an alter-
native means of compelling a defendant's appearance in state courts. If a
nonresident could not be reached under the state's personal jurisdiction
statutes, a plaintiff could attach that party's property within the state and
proceed in rem. If the owner refused to appear, a default judgment would
be entered.
If Shaffer requires actual personal jurisdiction, all such statutes are
unconstitutional and state statutes defining personal jurisdiction provide
the only means of reaching nonresident defendants. If, on the other
hand, actual personal jurisdiction is not required, plaintiffs may still
proceed under these statutes with the added due process requirement that
they show that the nonresident had minimum contacts with the forum
state.
Another related question unanswered by Shaffer concerns its effects
on present attachment proceedings designed to be utilized against the
property of nonresidents. Under Pennoyer v. Neff,"' it was establshed
that the in rem jurisdiction of the court must be invoked by the attach-
ment of the subject property. There is no doubt that attachment is still
available to plaintiffs who have acquired personal jurisdiction over de-
110. See Rebozo v. Washington Post Co., 515 F.2d 1208, 1211 (5th Cir. 1975) (observing
that the determination of whether a state may properly assert in personam jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant involves an inquiry into the scope of the state's long arm
provisions as well as an evaluation of the constitutional permissibility of jurisdiction);
Barrett v. Browning Arms Co., 433 F.2d 141, 142 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding that although
there was no constitutional barrier to an exercise of jurisdiction in this case, jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant could extend no further than permitted under the state's
long arm statute).
111. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. CODE § 302(a)(2)-(3) (McKinney 1872) (excluding
defamation actions from the state's long arm provisions which allow jurisdiction over
parties who commit tortious acts within the state or who commit tortious acts outside of
the state, causing an injury to persons or property within the state).
112. 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877).
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fendants, but, if personal jurisdiction is ultimately required, can a plain-
tiff attach prior to obtaining jurisdiction? In other words, since attach-
ment no longer confers jurisdiction, will the courts be willing to sanction
the attachment of property prior to the establishment of jurisdiction
through other means?" 3
Even if personal jurisdiction is not ultimately required prior to attach-
ment, courts will be unlikely to attach property without some showing by
the plaintiff that the non-resident has minimum contacts with the forum
state. This, however, could be easily achieved by simply requiring that
the plaintiff state facts supporting an allegation of minimum contacts in
his affidavit supporting the motion for attachment."'
D. Conclusion-In Rem Jurisdiction
Shaffer v. Heitner, while raising many questions, has retained almost
intact the elements of in rem jurisdiction which are useful and consistent
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.- 115 It has
discarded only those elements which were unfair or illogical. But Shaffer
has significant effect in an entirely separate area: it is the Supreme
Court's first major discussion of the minimum contacts test of Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington" 6 in nineteen years. The importance of
what is said regarding minimum contacts may, in the long run, far
outweigh anything the Court has expressed regarding in rem jurisdiction.
IV. EFFECTS UPON PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The final portion of the Shaffer opinion was devoted to the application
of International Shoe's minimum contacts test to the facts of the case. It
113. See note 119 infra. Shaffer did state that a court which could not obtain personal
jurisdiction over a debtor could, nevertheless, maintain an action against that debtor's
property where his indebtedness to the plaintiff had previously been determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction. 97 S. Ct. at 2583 n.36. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
Uranex (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 1977), summarized in 46 U.S.L.W. 2195 (Oct. 18, 1977),
discussed note 109 supra.
114. In California, for example, a plaintiff wishing to attach the property of a non-
resident must submit an affidavit with his application showing the following:
(1) The action is one described in Section .492.010 and is brought against a
defendant described in Section 492.010.
(2) The plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the
claim upon which the attachment is based.
(3) The property sought to be attached is subject to attachment pursuant to
Section 492.040.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 492.020(b) (West Supp. 1977). It would not unduly burden the
plaintiff to add to this, based upon his information and belief, facts constituting minimum
contacts. Id. § 492.020(c).
115. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
116. Id.
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is highly significant that the Court chose to address this issue rather than
remand it to the state courts since, as alleged by Justice Brennan, 1 7 the
record of the case did not supply an adequate factual background to allow
the Court to properly decide the issue. I8 It is also interesting to note that
the Court ignored the particular limitations of Delaware's jurisdictional
statutes and decided the issue as if Delaware possessed a long arm statute
coextensive with the outer limits of constitutional due process. 119 Since it
was not based upon the particular facts of the case, but rather dealt in
more general terms, this portion of the Court's decision more closely
resembles an advisory opinion than a holding. 2° The advisory nature of
the Shaffer opinion indicates that the method of analysis employed by the
Court is designed to serve as a model for future adjudications of state
court jurisdiction.
A. The Requirement of an Act by Which the Defendant Purposefully
A vails Himself of Forum Benefits
Since Hanson v. Denckla,121 lower courts have struggled to formulate
a test for personal jurisdiction which is consistent with the varying
standards prescribed by the Supreme Court in International Shoe,'
McGee"3 and Hanson, Until the decision in Hanson, the rule of
117. 97 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
118. Mr. Justice Brennan observed that a determination of minimum contacts is
highly dependent on creating a proper factual foundation detailing the contacts
between the forum state and the controversy in question. Because neither the plain-
tiff-appellee nor the state courts viewed such an inquiry as germane in this instance,
the Court today is unable to draw upon a proper factual record in reaching its
conclusion; moreover, its disposition denies appellee the normal opportunity to seek
discovery on the contacts issue.
Id. at 2589.
119. The Court apparently recognized that Delaware has no long arm statute under
which jurisdiction could be exercised in this case, but "assumed" that with proper notice
and minimum contacts the defendants could be brought before the Delaware courts. Id. at
2585 n.40. The Court's treatment of the issue ignores a state's ability to legislatively
delegate less authority to its courts than the Constitution allows. See notes 110-11 supra
and accompanying text.
This may suggest that the Court envisions that, in states such as Delaware which do not
have extensive long arm statutes, attachment proceedings may be commenced when the
defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum, despite the state court's
inability to establish actual personal jurisdiction over him by use of a state personal
jurisdiction statute.
Such an interpretation of the Court's position might also suggest that attachment would
be allowed to occur prior to the establishment of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
See notes 112-14 supra and accompanying text.
120. It is not unusual for the Court to utilize this "advisory opinion" form when dealing
with issues of the utmost significance. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
121. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
122. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
123. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
1977]
108 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
minimum contacts was applied time after time to increase the juris-
dictional reach of state courts. 124 In Hanson, however, a new control was
placed upon the growing application of the minimum contacts test.
Emphasizing an aspect of International Shoe which had previously
received little or no attention, the Hanson Court held that in order for an
exercise of jurisdiction to be permissible "it is essential in each case that
there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the
privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking
the benefits and protections of its laws." 1 25 The Court emphasized that
considerations of forum convenience were irrelevant in the absence of
purposeful availment: "However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he
has the 'minimal contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its
exercise of power over him."
12 6
In emphasizing "purposeful availment," Hanson demonstrated a shift
in emphasis from earlier decisions; in particular, McGee v. International
Life Insurance Co. 127 In McGee, the Court supplemented its analysis of
minimum contacts by emphasizing that it would be fair to subject the
defendant to the jurisdiction of the state. Fairness to the defendant was
equated to some degree with convenience. The Court noted that "modern
transportation and communication have made it much less burdensome
for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity. "128 The McGee Court said nothing about an act by
which the defendant had availed himself of forum benefits, and required
only that the defendant "have certain minimum contacts with [the state]
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice.' "129
124. See, e.g., id.; International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The
McGee Court recognized this phenomenon, noting that "a trend is clearly discernible
toward expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
other non-residents." 355 U.S. at 222. Cf. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342
U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that state courts could exercise jurisdiction in causes of action
not arising from contacts within the state when the defendant's contacts with the state
were so continuous and substantial that it would be fair to subject him to its jurisdiction).
125. 357 U.S. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319
(1945)). In International Shoe the Court stated:
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities
within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that state. The
exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure which
requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most
instances, hardly be said to be undue.
326 U.S. at 319.
126. 357 U.S. at 251.
127. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
128. Id. at 223.
129. Id. at 222 (citation omitted).
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Hanson thus differed from McGee in two significant respects. First, it
required an act of purposeful availment on the part of the defendant to
establish minimum contacts. Second, it held that forum convenience
was irrelevant to a finding of minimum contacts. However, while Han-
son seemingly established a new, stricter test of minimum contacts, it
also approved the continued viability of McGee. 130 In reconciling the two
decisions, the Hanson Court characterized the McGee facts as showing
"an act done or a transaction consummated in the forum state.''131 The
Court emphasized that in McGee the non-resident defendant had so-
licited a reinsurance agreement with a California resident, that the offer
was accepted in that state, and that the insurance premiums were mailed
from there.132 Yet, the acceptance of the offer and the payment of
premiums were not acts of the defendant, but acts of the plaintiff's
decedent. The only positive act of the defendant was the mailing of the
offer from Texas to California. Under a strict reading of Hanson, then,
the first two "acts" referred to in discussing McGee do not appear to
fulfill the requirements of a purposeful act by the defendant. Instead,
they more closely resemble the kind of "unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident" which the Court in Hanson
held to be insufficient to satisfy the requirement of a purposeful act by the
defendant. 133
Thus, by recognizing and approving McGee, the Court diminished the
probability that the Hanson test would be strictly applied. Hanson
clearly established the requirement of some kind of availment of forum
benefits, but allowed the requirement of an act within the state to be
beclouded by the Court's references to the acts in McGee. It was
predictable, then, that courts interpreting Hanson might react by em-
phasizing availment of forum benefits and de-emphasizing the require-
ment of an act within the state. 134 Some courts focused upon the fairness
130. 357 U.S. at 251-52.
131. Id. at 251.
132. Id. at 251-52.
133. Id. at 253. See also note 51 supra. Although two of the three acts in McGee do not
strictly fulfill the requirement of purposeful availment set out in Hanson, the.insurer's
solicitation of the reinsurance agreement was clearly a purposeful act by the defendant
and fulfills the Hanson test. The Court in Hanson made it clear that the McGee decision is
still valid law under Hanson. See 357 U.S. at 251-52.
134. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969) (finding that a manufacturer who could have foreseen that his
products would be resold to California businesses had "engaged in economic activity"
within the state, and thus fulfilled the Hanson requirement of an act); Gray v. American
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961) (establishing
that in products liability cases, an act within the state occurs when the injury occurs within
the state). But see Sibley v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 442,546 P.2d 322, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34,
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976) (finding that a guaranty by a nonresident of an obligation
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of exercising jurisdiction over nonresident defendants if their acts out-
side the state had foreseeable effects within the forum.135 In this way,
these courts created fictions to circumvent a literal reading of Hanson's
requirement of an act within the state.
136
In Kulko v. Superior Court,131 the California Supreme Court demon-
strated how easily the requirement of an act within the state could be
fulfilled prior to Shaffer. Pursuant to a foreign judgment of divorce, a
husband and wife agreed that the husband, a New York domiciliary,
would have custody of the couple's two children during the school year.
The children were to be allowed to visit the wife in California during
certain vacations. The couple's teen-aged daughter, however, decided
that she would prefer to live with her mother during the school year and
visit her father during vacation periods. The father provided his daughter
with a one-way plane ticket to California. The daughter moved to
California, but returned to spend a vacation with her father in New York.
After this vacation, the father again purchased a one-way plane ticket for
the daughter's return to California. The wife then brought an action in the
California courts to obtain increased child support.
138
The California Supreme Court held that the state could exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the father because he had purposefully availed
himself of the benefits of the forum in allowing his daughter to live
to a California partnership was not an act within the state and the guarantor could not be
subjected to the California courts' jurisdiction in an action for breach of contract and
breach of guaranty).
135. See, e.g., Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80
Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969).
136. Id. Mr. Justice Brennan's position in Shaffer is representative of this point of
view. He would emphasize that the Shaffer defendants "voluntarily associated them-
selves with the State of Delaware, 'invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 97
S. Ct. at 2592 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). He would not require an actual,
physical act by the defendants within the state, but rather would be satisfied to base
jurisdiction upon the effect caused in the state by their actions outside the state. Id.
137. 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977).
138. Id. at 519-20, 564 P.2d at 354-55, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88. The wife also sought to
obtain custody of the children and to establish the couple's Haitian divorce in California.
Id. at 520, 564 P.2d at 355, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 588. Although divorce and child custody cases
are determinations of status, which were excluded from the Shaffer Court's ruling, see
note 84 supra, actions for child support have traditionally required in personam juris-
diction over the defendant or in rem jurisdiction over his property. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v.
Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). It should be noted at the outset, however, that the
problem of obtaining child support from nonresident parents has long been a problem
area in law. Considerations of fairness and judicial efficiency may have motivated the
court in Kulko to develop a theory of in personam jurisdiction over the father.
The couple's son eventually joined his mother in California, but his departure from New
York was without the father's consent or assistance. Nevertheless, once the court found
that it could exercise personal jurisdiction over the father in connection with the daugh-
ter's support, it also exercised jurisdiction over the father in the matter of the son's
support. 19 Cal. 3d at 525, 564 P.2d at 358, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
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there.139 The availment was considered purposeful because the father had
allowed his daughter to leave and had provided her plane fare. 140 The
requirement of an act within the state was viewed as having been fulfilled
because the father's act in New York caused an effect in California. 141
In light of Shaffer v. Heitner, the validity of decisions such as Kulko
becomes questionable.142 Shaffer indicates that the rules of Hanson v.
Denckla are alive and well 43 and may be interpreted more strictly than
previously. The Court in Shaffer emphasized the necessity of an act
within the state, and refused to fabricate complicated fictions to establish
such an act.'" Although the defendants were fiduciaries of a Delaware
corporation who were being sued in Delaware on behalf of that corpora-
tion, the Court insisted that their affiliation with Delaware was inade-
quate: "Appellee Heitner did not allege and does not now claim that
appellants have ever set foot in Delaware. Nor does he identify any act
related to his cause of action as having taken place in Delaware."145
139. By allowing his child to live within the state, a parent was said to avail himself "of
the total panoply of the state's laws, institutions and resources-its police and fire
protection, its school system, its hospital services, its recreational facilities, its libraries
and museums .... ." 19 Cal. 3d at 522, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
140. Id. at 524, 564 P.2d at 357-58, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 590-91. In his dissent Judge
Richardson argued there was no purposeful availment by the father, but rather, he merely
"passively acquiesced in his teen-aged daughter's unilateral decision ... " Id. at 527,
564 P.2d at 360, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 593.
141. Id. at 521, 564 P.2d at 356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589. The court limited its decision by
stating that jurisdiction based upon causing an effect within the state could be expanded to
unreasonable proportions. The court therefore held that jurisdiction in such cases could
only be applied when "reasonable." Id.
Reasonableness in such cases is determined by examining whether "the nonresident
'purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in California or of the
benefits and protections of California laws . . . or anticipated that he would derive any
economic benefit as a result of his' act outside of California." Id. at 521-22, 564 P.2d at
356, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 589 (quoting Sibley v. Superior Court, 116 Cal. 3d 442, 447, 546 P.2d
322, 325, 128 Cal. Rptr. 34, 37, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826 (1976)).
142. Note that the Court in Shaffer did not find that the acceptance of a corporate
directorship was an act within the state. If the Court had been so inclined, it could have
theorized that acceptance of a corporate directorship is an act which causes effects within
the state. The corporation's profits go up or down depending upon the performance of the
corporate directors and the state's taxation of the corporation may therefore be affected.
Clearly, not all activities which cause effects within the state will constitute acts within the
state. A factual evaluation of Shaffer indicates that Shaffer requires a greater or more
direct effect within the state than the California courts found necessary in Kulko.
143. Some commentators have denigrated the importance of the Hanson rules, main-
taining that Hanson was merely an attempt by the Court to avoid giving full faith and
credit to an unfair decision by declaring that the decision was rendered without juris-
diction. See, e.g., Zammit, supra note 71, at 677.
144. For an example of such a fiction, see text accompanying note 141 supra.
145. 97 S. Ct. at 2585 (emphasis added). Mr. Justice Brennan took exception to the
Court's literal reading of the requirement of an act within the state. He noted that "[t]he
fact that the record does not reveal whether they 'set foot' or committed 'act [sic] related
to [the] cause of action' in Delaware . . . is not decisive, for jurisdiction can be based
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Despite the fact that the benefits of Delaware corporate law might have
been an incentive to the defendants in accepting directorships in the
corporation, and despite the fact that it might have been fair and just to
require defendants to respond to suit in Delaware, the Court refused to
consider these facts until a showing had been made that the defendants
had done some purposeful act within the state.146
In emphasizing this point, the Court dispelled some of the uncertainty
created by Hanson's approval of McGee. The notion that the defendant
has somehow enjoyed the benefits of the forum is insufficient to justify
an exercise of jurisdiction without a clear showing of an act within the
state.14 7 Considerations of fairness and forum convenience are similarly
irrelevant when an act has not been established. 148 However, it is not
clear in Shaffer what types of behavior will constitute an "act" within
the state. Shaffer's emphasis upon the fact that the defendants had never
"set foot" in Delaware may indicate that the Court will require a more
physical, tangible act within the state than has been required by some
state courts.149 On the other hand, the Shaffer Court's requirement of an
act within the state may simply utilize the word "act" as a term of art
encompassing the state courts' definitions of that term.150 All in all, the
tone of Shaffer indicates that the requirement of an act within the state
will receive greater emphasis in the future, and that the most attenuated
state court definitions of what constitutes an act will be rejected.''
B. Foreseeability
The concept of foreseeability has been utilized by courts to
support the exercise of jurisdiction over defendants whose acts outside
the state have caused effects within the state.152 In Shaffer, the Court
strictly on out-of-state acts having foreseeable effects in the forum state." Id. at 2591
(Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
146. Id. at 2586.
147. Compare Shaffer with Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458
P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969). Buckeye relied heavily upon the defendant's enjoyment
of the state's benefits, but created a complicated fiction to establish an act within the
state. Shaffer indicates that such emphasis upon availment will be unproductive without a
clear showing of an act within the state.
\ 148. The Shaffer Court ignored the argument that it would be "only fair and just" to
bring the defendants before the Delaware court. 97 S. Ct. at 2586.
149. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586
(1977); Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr.
113 (1969).
150. See notes 134-40 supra and accompanying text.
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Jones Enterprises, Inc. v. Atlas Serv. Corp., 442 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir.
1971) (architect who placed his design in the stream of commerce, knowing or having
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indicated that foreseeability of suit may be a factor in determining
jurisdiction. ' However, the Court abruptly ended its discussion of
foreseeability by finding that, under the circumstances of this case, it was
not foreseeable to corporate directors that they would be held amenable
to suit within the state of incorporation.154 Although this passing refer-
ence to the expectations of the directors in Shaffer constitutes the Court's
first recognition of the foreseeability doctrine, it leaves many questions
unanswered.
At the state level, foreseeability has been utilized as a bootstrapping
device to aid in establishing an act within the state. In ,Buckeye Boiler v.
Superior Court 155 for instance, the California Supreme Court found that
it would be foreseeable to an out-of-state manufacturer that his products
could be resold as used goods and subsequently find their way into
California.' 56 The foreseeable availability of these secondary markets
was said to establish that the manufacturer had engaged in economic
activity within the state and thereby had purposefully availed himself of
its benefits. 57 Thus, the fact the defendant could foresee that its products
might enter the forum state and cause injury there was held to fulfill the
Hanson test for jurisdiction. 158
Shaffer's positive reference to foreseeability, coupled with its empha-
sis upon an act within the state, creates confusion as to the extent of the
Court's endorsement of the foreseeability criterion. If an act within the
state is to be required, foreseeability can relate to that act in one of two
ways. First, foreseeability of an effect within the state can be utilized, as
in Buckeye, to establish the very existence of the act within the state. As
noted above, however, 15 9 Shaffer implies the Court will now require
reason to know that it would reach the forum state, could be subjected to that state's
jurisdiction in a tort action); Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir.
1970) (manufacturer who sold products to a retailer, knowing that the retailer would ship
the products into Texas, could be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Texas courts);
Southern Mach. Co. v. Mohasco Indus., Inc., 401 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1968) (defendant who
set business operations in motion, and who could reasonably have foreseen consequences
within Tennessee, was subject to the jurisdiction of that state's courts); Buckeye Boiler
Co. v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1969) (manufacturer
who placed products in the stream of commerce, knowing they might be resold to
California businesses, was amenable to the jurisdiction of the California courts).
153. The Court remarked: "Moreover, appellants had no reason to expect to be haled
before a Delaware court." 97 S. Ct. at 2586.
154. Id.
155. 71 Cal. 2d 893, 458 P.2d 57, 80 Cal.,Rptr. 113 (1969). See note 134 supra.
156. Id. at 905, 458 P.2d at 66, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 122.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 907, 458 P.2d at 67, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 123.
159. See notes 142-51 supra and accompanying text.
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stronger evidence of an act. This makes Buckeye's bootstrapping tech-
nique for finding an act within the state highly questionable.
A second and more likely interpretation of Shaffer's endorsement of
the foreseeability criterion is that foreseeability can help to establish
purposefulness once an act has been revealed. When a defendant acts for
his own benefit, knowing that the consequences of his act may be felt
within the forum state, the defendant's awareness of the consequences of
his act constitutes a purposeful choice by which he avails himself of the
forum's benefits. Once the purposeful act has been thus established, the
foreseeability criterion will also aid in establishing that an exercise of
jurisdiction over the defendant is fundamentally fair.
C. State Interest
In Shaffer v. Heitner the Court made two inconsistent statements
regarding state interest as a criterion in determining jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate. In one part of the Shaffer opinion, the Court noted that the state's
interest in assuring the marketability of property within the state, and in
providing a means for the peaceful resolution of disputes concerning such
property, would support the exercise of state court jurisdiction."6 Yet
later the Court implied that state interest is merely a choice of law
criterion, and has only a marginal impact upon determinations of state
court jurisdiction. The Court stated:
[E]ven if Heitner's assessment of the importance of Delaware's
interest is accepted, his argument fails to demonstrate that Delaware
is a fair forum for this litigation. The interest appellee has identified
may support the application of Delaware law to resolve any con-
troversy over appellants' actions in their capacities as officers and
directors. But we have rejected the argument that if a State's law can
properly be applied to a-dispute, its courts necessarily have juris-
diction over the parties to that dispute. 161
In determining the fairness of subjecting a nonresident defendant to a
state's jurisdiction, the Court has rarely given so little weight to a state's
interest. Although since International Shoe fairness has been a prerequi-
site to the exercise of state court jurisdiction; it had largely been assumed
when the state had a substantial interest in the litigation. 62 In Mullane v.
160. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
161. Id. at 2586 (footnote omitted).
162. In the dissenting portion of his opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that the
Supreme Court's earlier decisions in this area "establish that the State's valid substantive
interests are important considerations in assessing whether it constitutionally may claim
jurisdiction over a given cause of action." Id. at 2590. He went on to recognize, however,
that state interest alone would not justify an exercise of jurisdiction in all cases. Id.
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Central Hanover Bank, 163 a case involving jurisdiction over unknown,
nonresident trust beneficiaries, the Court relied heavily upon the state's
interest in the litigation. Fairness to the nonresident parties was not
emphasized, but rather, the state interest factor seemed all but sufficient
in itself to justify an exercise of jurisdiction. The Court stated:
[T]he interest of each State in providing means to close trusts that
exist by the grace of its laws and are administered under the supervi-
sion of its courts is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
beyond doubt the right of its courts to determine the interests of all
claimants, resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords
full opportunity to appear and be heard. 164
Again in McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. ,165 the Court
placed considerable weight upon the interests of the state: "It cannot be
denied that California has a manifest interest in providing effective
means of redress for its residents when their insurers refuse to pay
claims. ' 1
Yet in Hanson v. Denckla,' 67 the Court was not responsive to the
argument that Florida's interest in the case was a viable jurisdictional
criterion. In Hanson, the state interest which the Florida parties urged
created jurisdiction was that the laws of Florida would be applicable to
the controversy and that most of the parties were domiciled in Florida. 1
68
These considerations, however, are traditionally equated with determin-
ing the application of law rather than involving a state interest in provid-
ing a forum. Recognizing this, the Court held that a state "does not
acquire . . . jurisdiction by being the 'center of gravity' of the con-
troversy, or the most convenient location for litigation. The issue is
personal jurisdiction, not choice of law.'
169
This same language is used in Shaffer to de-emphasize state interest as
a jurisdictional criterion.7 0 In Hanson, however, the Court was referring
163. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See notes 90-92 supra and accompanying text.
164. Id. at 313.
165. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
166. Id. at 223. For early cases stressing state interest, see Henry L. Doherty & Co. v.
Goodman, 294 U.S. 623(1935); Hess v., Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
167. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
168. Id. at 254.
169. Id., cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2586. But see Mr. Justice Black's
dissent in Hanson, 357 U.S. at 256, and note that Mr. Justice Brennan joined with Mr.
Justice Black in recognizing that choice of law issues and jurisdictional criteria are not
identical, but that in the Hanson case, state interest would have been a sufficient
jurisdictional consideration to justify an exercise of state jurisdiction. Id. at 258-61. See
also Shaffer, 97 S. Ct. at 2591 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
170. 97 S. Ct. at 2586.
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to what was clearly a choice of law question. The Florida parties'
contentions that convenience and applicability of state law were suffi-
cient to justify jurisdiction"' failed to establish any substantive state
interest in exercising that jurisdiction. In Shaffer, the state interest urged
by the plaintiff was not based on choice of law, but rather concerned the
substantive interest of the state in regulating the conduct of officers of its
own corporations.172 Such state interests have previously been viewed by
the Court as legitimate considerations in determining local jurisdiction. 
173
Therefore, Shaffer's reliance upon the Hanson language was not entirely
accurate. The Hanson language did, however, provide a convenient
source of authority for the proposition that state interest is primarily a
choice of law criterion, and is of limited importance in determinations of
jurisdiction. This proposition completely ignores the discussions of state
interest in Mullane and McGee.
The Shaffer Court's reliance upon Hanson in declaring that state
interest is merely relevant to choice of law is little more than a judicial
smokescreen designed to disguise a change in policy. The Court's deci-
sion that traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice require that
the defendant commit some act within the forum state 74 necessitated a
reevaluation of the Court's stance on state interest. If state interest alone
were jurisdictional, it would be possible for state courts to exercise
jurisdiction over nonresidents who had not committed acts within that
state. State interest then, while a viable consideration in the days of
McGee and Mullane, will not be a substitute for the required act under
Shaffer.
175
It is Mullane which provides a key to the apparent contradiction in
Shaffer regarding state interest. Mullane was a case of "jurisdiction by
necessity.' 1 76 Because the subject property was located within the state
and the unknown claimants were scattered throughout the country, it
appeared that there was no other forum in which the case could be
litigated. The concept of state interest was pressed into service to insure
171. 357 U.S. at 254.
172. 97 S. Ct. at 2586.
173. Id. at 2590 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See also McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306
(1950); Henry L. Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Hess v. Pawloski, 274
U.S. 352 (1927).
174. 97 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
175. Id. at 2586.
176. "Jurisdiction by necessity" refers to cases where no adequate alternative forum is
available. In Mullane, the unknown beneficiaries could have been dispersed among the
forty-eight states, with no single state court having the ability to subject all of the parties
to its jurisdiction.
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that the controversy could be litigated somewhere. 177 The same strategy
is apparent in Shaffer. The state's interest in the marketability of proper-
ty located within the state1 78 was utilized to augment the concept that
anyone claiming property within the state purposefully avails himself of
the state's benefits.
179
In disallowing the old forms of in rem jurisdiction, the Court had
created a practical problem in the adjudication of traditional true in rem
and quasi in rem I proceedings. "I The fiction that anyone claiming
property within a state availed himself of state benefits was too fragile,
standing alone, to unequivocally support jurisdiction in many true in rem
and quasi in rem I cases. Therefore, the Court provided additional
support for an exercise of jurisdiction in the form of the state interest
doctrine. The two theories, taken together, are designed to provide
justification for the exercise of jurisdiction in most true in rem and quasi
in rem I cases where it would be difficult to find another appropriate
forum. Finally, the Court further endeavored to assure a state court's
ability to hear true in rem and quasi in rem I cases concerning property
located within the state by holding that the rule of Shaffer does not
necessarily apply to cases where property is located within the state and
no other forum is available.181
Under Shaffer, the state interest doctrine plays a limited role in the
exercise of jurisdiction. It will be used to justify personal jurisdiction in
cases traditionally adjudicated as true in rem and quasi in rem I actions.
In other actions, however, where the doctrine is not essential to support
"jurisdiction by necessity," state interest will be significantly reduced in
importance and will not, by itself, be determinative of the "fairness" of
a particular forum. 182
D. The Defendant, the Forum, and the Litigation
Throughout its opinion in Shaffer, the Court repeatedly stressed the
177. Mullane's reference to the interest of the state in "providing means to close
trusts," 339 U.S. at 313, implies that there would be no "means" to close the trust in
Mullane if the New York forum were not available. With regard to due process notice
requirements, the Mullane Court again indicated its desire to provide at least one forum
for the litigation, stating that "[a] construction of the Due Process Clause which would
place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified." Id. at 313-14.
178. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
179. Id.
180. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
181. 97 S. Ct. at 2584 n.37. Despite these safeguards, Mr. Justice Powell did not appear
to be convinced that the Court had effectively assured the availability of a forum for all
true in rem and quasi in rem I actions. Id. at 2586. See note 28 supra.
182. See, e.g., 97 S. Ct. at 2586.
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relationship between "the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."
183
This terminology, although new, is totally consistent with earlier expres-
sions of the minimum contacts. test relating to nonresident defendants.
An examination of the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation involves an inquiry into three basic component relation-
ships: (1) the relationship between the defendant and the litigation; (2)
the relationship between the defendant and the forum; and (3) the rela-
tionship between the forum and the litigation.
Since the defendant and the litigation will invariably be alleged to be
related, the emphasis of this new terminology cannot be meant to high-
light the first component relationship. The second component relation-
ship-between the defendant and the forum-has been so emphasized in
International Shoe and Hanson that the new terminology can hardly add
to the importance already attributed to that relationship. The third com-
ponent relationship-between the forum and the litigation-has also
been recognized for many years. 184 It has been embodied in the require-
ment that the litigation arise from or relate to the defendant's minimum
contacts with the forum state. A cause of action arising from an act in
Maine cannot ordinarily be litigated in California, even if the defendant
has other contacts with California. 185 The litigation must be related to the
California contacts thus creating a relationship between the forum and the
litigation.
The new phraseology, then, seems only to combine the traditional tests
of International Shoe and Hanson with the test of "arising from or
relating to," in a single, concise formulation. The lesson to be learned
from this newest formulation of the traditional rules is that all of the
essential relationships must be present and examined in their totality to
properly determine jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. A relation-
ship between the defendants and the forum will not be sufficient in itself
183. Id. at 2580. See generally id, at 2571-82.
184. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). See
note 97 supra. The requirement that the cause of action the plaintiff seeks to litigate in
state court arise from or relate to the defendant's minimum contacts with that state implies
that the litigation must be related to the forum. But see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (holding that state courts could exercise jurisdiction on causes of
action not arising from contacts within the state when the defendant's contacts with the
state were continuous and substantial, rather than minimal).
185. See Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 998 (1974) (holding that when an aircraft manufacturer had contacts with the State of
California, but the cause of action did not arise from those contacts, the manufacturer was
not subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts); L.D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz.
v. Higgins Indus., Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959) (holding that when a flooring company
had contacts with the State of California, but the cause of action did not arise from those
contacts, the manufacturer was not subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts).
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if there is no relationship between the forum and the litigation so that the
cause of action does not relate to forum contacts. Nor will a relationship
between the forum and the litigation be sufficient in itself, as it might
have been under the McGee-Mullane state interest doctrine. State inter-
est. will not apply unless there are also sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum. In Shaffer, although there was an alleged
relationship between the forum and the litigation, there was not a suffi-
cient connection between the defendant and the forum. Only one of the
tests was satisfied and jurisdiction was denied.1
86
E. Consent
The Court implicitly recognized the rule that in the absence of
minimum contacts, states may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants if it can be ascertained that they have consented to the
jurisdiction of the state.187 The Court indicated that a state statute "that
treats the acceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the
State" would have provided a proper basis for jurisdiction in Shaffer.1
88
Shaffer therefore allows states to protect significant state interests in
areas where minimum contacts might not be found by passing statutes
which establish that certain acts by the defendant constitute consent to
state court jurisdiction. In light of Shaffer's refusal to recognize the
implied consent of the directors in this case, states which are insecure
about their ability to exercise jurisdiction over such defendants would be
well advised to enact express statutes to protect their interests.
89
186. Under this analysis of the meaning of the phrase "the defendant, the forum, and
the litigation," the reason for the Court's de-emphasis of the state interest criterion gains
still another dimension. While state interest may show that one of the required relation-
ships is present-the relationship between the forum and the litigation-a showing of state
interest alone has no bearing whatsoever upon the other necessary part of the equation.
There must also be a relationship between the defendant and the forum. Therefore, state
interest will never be completely determinative of jurisdiction.
187. 97 S. Ct. at 2586. The Court has long recognized the validity of jurisdiction based
upon the consent of the defendant. See generally Developments, supra note 60, at 943-45.
188. 97 S. Ct. at 2586. The existence of other such statutes was recognized by the Court
without criticism. Id. at 2586 n.47. The Court has historically upheld a state's ability to
exact the consent of nonresidents to suit within that state through the use of such
statutes. See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). See note 43 supra.
189. Presumably in response to Shaffer, Delaware has recently passed a statute which
equates the acceptance of a directorship in a Delaware corporation with consent to suit in
Delaware. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 3114 (1978).
Shaffer does not, however, preclude findings of implied consent to justify jurisdiction
under the proper circumstances. It is arguable that the Court could have found implied
consent under the facts presented.
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F. Presence
Presence was one of the earliest devices used by the courts to secure
jurisdiction over the person. 19° Jurisdiction based upon presence was a
corollary to the state's power over all persons and property located within
its boundaries.' 9 ' Although in International Shoe, the Court recognized
that corporate presence was a legal fiction of limited utility,1 92 it did not
question the practice of states exercising jurisdiction over any individual
present within the state.193 In fact, by its very language, International
Shoe encouraged the continuation of jurisdiction based upon the mere
presence of the individual.194
In predicating its ruling upon International Shoe, the Court in Shaf-
fer 95 perpetuated the rule that the presence of persons within the state
would, without more, provide a sufficient basis for an exercise of
jurisdiction. However, in stating that the mere presence of property
within the state would no longer be sufficient to support jurisdiction,
96
the Court repudiated the conceptual underpinnings upon which the pres-
ence doctrine was based.197 If the state court's inherent territorial power
is no longer sufficient to establish jurisdiction over property within the
state, it would be only logical to find that the mere presence of persons
would also be insufficient.' 98
The presence doctrine has occasionally been invoked to justify exer-
cises of jurisdiction which seem fundamentally unfair. 199 Parties have
190. See generally Developments, supra note 60, at 937-39.
191. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,722 (1877) (holding that as a consequence
of the state's exclusive sovereignty over persons and property located within the state,
that state's courts have the power to adjudicate matters concerning activities that occur
within the state). See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying text.
192. 326 U.S. at 316-17.
193. Id. at 316.
194. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text.
195. 97 S. Ct. at 2587.
196. Id. at 2582-83.
197. Under Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), the state's ability to exercise juris-
diction was based upon its territorial power over all persons and property located within
its boundaries. Shaffer, 97 S. Ct. at 2577. If the power doctrine can no longer support
absolute jurisdiction over all property within the state, it theoretically should not be able
to support absolute jurisdiction over all persons present within the state.
198. It could be argued, however, that every person who voluntarily enters the state
does an act by which he avails himself of the state's benefits and thus subjects himself to
the state's jurisdiction.
199. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (a defendant
was served in an airplane passing over Arkansas, and was successfully subjected to the
jurisdiction of that state's courts because he was served while "present" in the state);
Nielsen v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737 (1963) (where a nonresident defend-
ant was passing through Minnesota and was served in relation to a cause of action that
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been served in airplanes flying over states with which they have no
contacts and subjected to state court jurisdiction because they were
served while "present" within the state.2°° Shaffer's concern for the
rights and expectations 0 1 of the defendant indicates that the Court would
disapprove of such exercises of jurisdiction. However, in recognizing the
viability of consent to justify jurisdiction over a party who has no
minimum contacts with the state,2' the Court has implicitly held that not
all traditional forms of jurisdiction must be based upon minimum con-
tacts. Until the Court is prepared to apply the minimum contacts standard
to jurisdiction based upon presence, domicile and consent, it may fairly
be assumed that defendants subjected to jurisdiction under these three
theories are still not entitled to the "fair play and substantial justice"
accorded to other defendants.
20 3
V. CONCLUSION
Although Shaffer v. Heitner will become known as the case which
radically altered in rem jurisdiction, it will have little practical effect
upon cases traditionally litigated under the in rem rules. Shaffer's real
impact will be felt in the area of personal jurisdiction. For those who
were not convinced by the language of Hanson v. Denckla, Shaffer
serves as a forceful reminder that the jurisdiction of state courts cannot be
expanded beyond certain limits. However, under Shaffer, the extent of
arose in another state, the court characterized the defendant's objection to service based
upon presence alone as frivolous).
200. See, e.g., Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
201. See 97 S. Ct. at 2585-87.
202. In Shaffer the Court found that no minimum contacts existed, but implied that,
despite the lack of minimum contacts, consent to suit would have rendered jurisdiction
permissible. Id. at 2586.
203. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See notes 44-46
supra and accompanying text.
The argument relating to presence can also be related to domicile in some unusual cases.
When a party has left his domicile and has not established a new domicile in which he
plans to reside indefinitely, he remains a domiciliary of the state he has left behind. Mas v.
Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 842 (1974). Domicile alone is
sufficient to justify the exercise of jurisdiction over an absent domiciliary. Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). Yet a career soldier, born in Maine, who leaves his home
at age eighteen to join the army, could well be considered a domiciliary of Maine thirty
years after his departure if he has failed to establish a new domicile. Thus, despite the fact
that the soldier may be stationed in Hawaii and may never have returned to Maine, he may
still be subjected to suit in Maine if the present domicile rules continue in force.
It seems necessary to have the ability to sue every individual in at least one place. But if
minimum contacts cannot be established, and if it does not comport with "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice" to sue an individual in his technical domicile,
perhaps the rule of domicile, like the rules of in rem jurisdiction and presence, should be
discarded in unusual and unfair circumstances.
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those limits remains unclear. A literal reading of the Court's language
would suggest that a physical act within the state is a prerequisite to
jurisdiction. Yet, it is doubtful that such an interpretation will prevail in
light of the widespread judicial acceptance of fictions adopted by the
state courts to fulfill the requirement of an act within the state. The
opinion provides no guidelines as to which of these fictions will consti-
tute a sufficient "act." Shaffer leaves behind only a vague sensation that
an" "act" is something more than a foreseeable effect.
Rita Miller
